We compare three motivation procedures in a voting eJperiment: 1) subNects paid a Oat fee for participating, 2) subNects paid according to choices as is typical in a political economy eJperiment, and 3) subNects paid double the typical amount. We also vary compleJity of the voting game. Financial incentives signiRcantly increase the probability that subNects choose Bayesian-Nash predicted strategies. In the simpler game the typical Rnancial incentive is suUcientV higher payments have no eWect. But in the compleJ game, increasing Rnancial incentives beyond the typical level is consequential. Further, repetition interacts with typical Rnancial incentives in the compleJ game to increase the likelihood of Bayesian-Nash strategies. The evidence suggests that Rnancial incentives increase subNectsZ cognitive attention to eJperimental tasks as individuals would be in comparable observational settings, which enhances theory evaluation in eJperiments and the eJternal validity of the results.
Introduction
EJperimentation is increasing in political science. As evidence, Morton and Williams (forthcoming) report that during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , three of the top Nournals in the discipline_The Amer' ican Political 0cience Review, The American 5ournal of Political 0cience, and The 5ournal of Politics9published 33 articles containing eJperimental research. In contrast, only 47 such articles were published in these Nournals in the previous decade and only 25 in the 1980s.
EJperimentation is also increasingly being published in monographs and specialized Nournals.
The eJperimental community producing this research is divided into two groups_political psychologists and political economists. Although there is much that is similar in the methods used by these two camps, there are a few noteworthy diWerences. dne concerns how subNects are motivated. In almost all political economy laboratory eJperiments, Rnancial incentives are used to motivate subNects such that subNectsZ pay is a function of the choices made in the eJperiment. Researchers then vary how these choices translate into payments and measure how subNectsZ behavior responds to these changes. In contrast, in almost all political psychology laboratory eJperiments and many Reld eJperiments of both stripes (particularly survey eJperiments), subNects are paid a Oat fee for participation (which may involve credit in a class at a university) or not paid for participating. The choices subNects make in the eJperiment do not aWect how much they are paid.
Financial incentives are used in political economy eJperiments because they are seen as advantageous in achieving the goals of the research. Most political economy eJperiments are focused on theory evaluation, usually formally derived theories. For eJample, a researcher may have a theory about how diWerent institutional rules used in legislatures aWect how members vote and the policies chosen. In order to evaluate the theory, the researcher would like to be able to compare how subNects, acting like legislators, choose under the diWerent rules. By keeping the relationship between voting outcomes and payments constant across diWerent institutions, the researcher can then compare the institutions. Causal inferences such as these can often be impossible using non-eJperimental data because of the diUculties in making cross-country and cross-time comparisons given the co-variation in other relevant variables. The control allows researchers to disentangle speciRc causal eWects.
Financial incentives are also used because they can provide the results with greater eJternal validity. EJternal validity has to do with whether empirical results hold over variations in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables. Do the results from one dataset (either eJperimental or observational) generalize to another (either eJperimental or observational)e To the eJtent that Rnancial incentives make the choices facing the subNects as salient as they are in other settings, particularly observational ones, then Rnancial incentives increase eJternal validity. SubNects in eJperiments may, because of the environment in which the choices take place, have diWerent motivations that can complicate the ability to generalize to other settings. Financial incentives can reduce those conOicting motivations, focusing subNects on the cognitive tasks as an individual might be focused in settings outside of the eJperiment as in legislatures or other political conteJts.
The argument that Rnancial incentives can eWectively induce subNects to be motivated as desired by the eJperimentor for theory evaluation and eJternal validity is referred to as the labor theory of cognition fsee Smith (1976 Smith ( , 1982 and Smith and Walker (1993) g. The Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments presumption is that incentives that are salient will cause subNects to devote cognitive labor and eWort in making choices in the eJperiment in the same wa: they would outside of the eJperiment. How subNects make these choices may not necessarily be irationalj as deRned by satisfying a game theoretic prediction in which the actors selRshly maJimize their payoWs.
SubNects may choose to be altruistic, display motives that illustrate fairness or reciprocity, make systematic cognitive errors, or be inOuenced by racial, ethnic, or gender stereotypes in how the eJperiment is framed or in response to priming. When subNects make these types of choices in the face of salient Rnancial consequences, then the proof that these other motivations are signiRcant for the subNects is more robust than when subNects face no Rnancial consequences to their decisions. Similarly, if subNects are more likely to choose according to the game theoretic prediction as saliency or Rnancial incentives increase, then how much subNects receive in the form of Rnancial incentives is an important factor to consider in evaluating the results of the research.
If Rnancial incentives have these advantages, then why are they not used by political psychologists as welle It is possible for political psychology eJperiments to include incentive payments. For eJample, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) investigate subNectsZ use of information in a hypothetical election where subNects have diWerent options and constraints on acquiring information or using shorthand cues. Based on measures of political attitudes taken before the eJperiment, they evaluate how close the subNectsZ choices are to those they would have made given those attitudes and full information about the candidates in the hypothetical election. They label a choice as correct if the subNect chooses candidates closer to their preferences as reported before the eJperiment, incorrect otherwise. Such an eJperiment could
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involve Rnancial incentives where subNects would be paid more for making correct choices. Hulland and <leinmutz (1994) , in a similar eJperiment on information gathering, found that incentives increased how much individuals searched for information. Similarly, lalentino, et al.Zs (2002) study of racial priming could use similar methods to give subNects an incentive to choose candidates on the basis of policy preferences they have that the researchers measure in advance. If in the face of salient incentives as would occur observationally, racial priming cues aWect subNectsZ preferences over candidates, the researchersZ results would arguably be more eJternally valid.
We suspect political psychologists do not use Rnancial incentives for the same reasons that psychologists obNect to them. Psychologists are often interested in measuring (rather than controlling) the intrinsic motivations of subNects in individualized decision making environments. From this perspective, some believe that Rnancial incentives should be used only such that they support the subNectZs intrinsic goals so that they can be more easily measured. 1 Furthermore, psychologists argue that Rnancial incentives can icrowd outj a subNectZs intrinsic motivations for completing eJperimental tasks and lead to lower task performance yielding inaccurate conclusions about subNectsZ behavior. 2 Although the eWects of incentives in eJperiments have been studied by psychologists and some economists, a literature we review in the neJt section, the eWects in the types of eJperiments conducted by political economists, particularly voting games, has received little study. 3 The crowding out eWect could mean that the use of Rnancial incentives in 1 See Ashton (1990), Hogarth et al. (1991), and Shah, Higgins, and Friedman (1998) . 2 See Deci and Ryan (1985) . 3 To our knowledge, the only other study of the eWects of Rnancial incentives in an eJperiment by political scientists is Prior and Lupia (2005) , which we review in the neJt section. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) report on a voting eJperiment where payments varied as well, which we also review in the neJt section.
political economy eJperiments does not accomplish the goals of the eJperimentors. In terms of theory evaluation, if subNects are intrinsically motivated without Rnancial incentives to devote cognitive activity to the choices before them and the cognitive activity is reduced when Rnancial incentives are introduced, then Rnancial incentives could have a perverse eWect and hinder the ability to use the eJperiments for theory testing. In terms of eJternal validity, if it is true that the intrinsic motivations of subNects are closer to the motivations that subNects have in noneJperimental settings, then crowding out could be a problem for the generalizability of the results. For eJample, in voting eJperiments it may be the case that subNects have an intrinsic motivation to eJpress their preferences in a sincere manner and to not engage in strategic behavior. If these motivations are suppressed by Rnancial incentives, then the incentives can be problematic for eJternal validity.
However, subNects in eJperiments may have intrinsic motivations that are eJperiment speciRc. They may simply want to Rnish the eJperiment as quickly as possible and make choices that allow them to do so, devoting little cognitive activity to the task, so that they can do other things more salient to them. dr they may overvalue minor aspects of the eJperiment (candidate names, colors used, etc.) that would be irrelevant to them in a comparable choice environment outside of the eJperiment. dr subNects may think that the eJperimentor has a particular research outcome in mind and make choices that either support or oppose that research outcome based on their own personal views of the research.
If Rnancial incentives crowd out these types of intrinsic motivations, then crowding out is desirable. The conNecture behind the labor theory of cognition and the use of Rnancial incentives is that intrinsic motivations of subNects are of this sort.
In this paper we present a political economy voting eJperiment in which we vary subNectsZ Rnancial incentives as well as the cognitive diUculty of the tasks before the subNects.
SubNects participated in treatments where they were paid a Oat fee, ones where they were given a Rnancial incentive that is typical in political economy eJperiments, and one where they were given a Rnancial incentive that was double the typical amount. We varied the cognitive task before the subNects by varying the information available to them about the task_in some voting games subNects had complete information about the payoWs that all voters would receive and in others they only had incomplete information on those payoWs.
We Rnd that Rnancial incentives aWect subNectsZ choices signiRcantly. In both the easy and hard treatments, subNectsZ choices are signiRcantly closer to those predicted by the Nash equilibrium when paid either the typical payment or the high payment. While we Rnd no signiRcant diWerence between the choices in the typical and high payment treatments when voters are completely informed, we Rnd that when voters have incomplete information they are signiRcantly more likely to make choices closer to the Bayesian-Nash predictions under the high payment scheme than in the typical one. This suggests that for easy tasks, increasing Rnancial incentives beyond those typically employed does not aWect behavior, but for more diUcult tasks, doing so can have a signiRcant eWect on behavior. dur eJperiments also allow us to evaluate theories of intrinsic motivations in these types of eJperiments and whether crowding out, which we observe, is desirable. dur analysis suggests that when Rnancial incentives are not involved subNects display a tendency to either make simple, easy choices, or to choose randomly, devoting less cognitive attention to the tasks at hand. Although there is some evidence of an intrinsic motivation to vote sincerely in the simple voting game, when the voting game becomes compleJ, that evidence disappears and voters who do not receive Rnancial incentives vote sincerely less often than predicted by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Their choices appear random or designed to thwart the eJperimentorZs goals.
In the neJt section we review the eJisting literature on Rnancial incentives in laboratory eJperiments. We then present our voting game, theoretical predictions, and eJperimental design. The fourth section provides our eJperimental results and the Rfth section discusses interpretations of the results for eJperiments in political science and concluding remarks.
Research on Financial Incentives in Experiments
The eJisting research on the eWects of Rnancial incentives does not lead to a clear conclusion. dn the one hand, studies by economists suggest that performance-based incentives lead to reductions in framing eWects, the time it takes for subNects to reach equilibrium in market eJperiments, and mistakes in predictions and probability calculations. 4 Furthermore, a growing number of Reld and marketing eJperiments show that choices made by subNects in hypothetical situations are signiRcantly diWerent from the choices made by subNects in comparable real situations in which Rnancial incentives are involved, suggesting that using hypothetical situations in place of Rnancial incentives leads to biased and ineUcient predictions about behavior. 5 4 See Brase, Fiddick, and Harries (2006) , Hogarth, Gibbs, Mc<enzie, and Marquis (1991) , Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) , Levin, Chapman, and Johnson (1988) , List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), drdnoez, Mellers, Chang, and Roberts (1995) , Parco, Rapoport, and Stein (2002) , and Wright and Aboul-Ess (1988) . Camerer and Hogarth (1999) review a wide range of studies and Rnd that higher Rnancial incentives leads to better task performance. Hertwig and drtmann (2001) , in a similar review, found that when payments were used subNectsZ task performances were higher. 5 Bishop and Heberlein (1986) show that willingness-to-pay values of deer-hunting permits were signiRcantly overstated in a hypothetical condition as compared to a paid condition. List and Shogren (1998) Rnd that the selling price for a gift is signiRcantly higher in real situations than in hypothetical ones. List (2001) demonstrates that in a hypothetical bidding game bids were signiRcantly higher than in one in which real
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In a noteworthy study in political science, Prior and Lupia (2005) Rnd that giving subNects Rnancial incentives to give correct answers in a survey eJperiment on political knowledge induced subNects to take more time and to give more accurate responses. The only other voting eJperiment we know of where Rnancial incentives were varied is that of Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) who consider the eWects of Rnancial incentives in a voting game in which subNects voted over a reward scheme for performance on individualized tasks. dne scheme gave a prize to 50p of the subNects independent of their performance on the task, while the alternative rewarded with a prize only those subNects who scored at the median or better on the task. Although it is common to Rnd that the maNority of survey respondents believe they are better than the median on tasks, the voting responses demonstrated less overconRdence, and even underconRdence, as Rnancial incentives were increased. dn the other hand, a large number of studies by psychologists have found evidence that Rnancial incentives lower task performance by crowding out intrinsic motivations. 6 Most of this research focuses on individualized decision making rather than choices within the conteJt of a group or game situation as in political economy eJperiments. A recent eJample is Heyman and Ariely (2004) Zs study of the consequences of varying payment levels on the performance of subNects engaged in individualized tasks which ranged from boring, repetitive ones to solving puzzle problems which progressed in diUculty during the eJperiment. They studied the eWects of a small payment, a sizeable one, and whether the payment was monetary or candy. They also ran the eJperiment without paying subNects for performance. payments were used. In marketing research, Dino, Grewal, and Liechty (2005) present evidence that shows signiRcantly better information is gathered on subNectsZ preferences over diWerent attributes of meal choices when the meals are not hypothetical but real. And loelckner (2006) Rnds signiRcant diWerences between consumersZ reported willingness to pay for products in hypothetical choice situations as compared to real choices across a variety of methods used to measure willingness to pay in marketing studies. 6 See Deci and Ryan (1985) for a review of the early literature.
Heyman and Ariely found that when subNects were not given incentive payments (either money or candy) the number of completed tasks was higher than with small incentive payments. Further, when the incentive payment was not eJplicitly monetary, that is, candy, the performance was higher than in the small monetary payment condition. Increasing incentive payments of both types increased performance, although not always reaching the levels of task performance in the control condition with no payment. These results support the contention that Rnancial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivations and lead to less task performance.
A number of possible eJplanations for why eJplicit Rnancial incentives might worsen task performance in eJperiments have been proWered. dne is that the cognitive eWort induced by the incentives may be counter productive, causing subNects to ioverthinkj a problem and miss simple solutions as subNects try more compleJ cognitive strategies in order to maJimize payoWs. Financial incentives may cause subNects to think they should eJert more eWort than necessary when simpler decision processes such as heuristics are suUcient. 7 According to this eJplanation we would eJpect that Rnancial incentives are most harmful for simple, easy tasks or ones where cognitive shortcuts can be eWective even in a situation that is complicated.
A second proposed cause is suggested by Meloy, Russo, and Miller (2006) who Rnd that Rnancial incentives in eJperiments can elevate a subNectZs mood and this contributes to worsened task performance. Meloy, et al. note that the eWect they and others Rnd might be mitigated if the subNects receive feedback and eJperience. This suggests that Rnancial incentives interact with feedback and eJperience and failure to provide those additional features leads to inaccurate estimates of their eWects. It is worth noting that the eJperiments Finally, a fourth eJplanation of crowding out is informational. Benabou and Tirole 8 A number of studies that show that individuals are more likely to volunteer and contribute to public goods when participation is not tied to Rnancial incentives such as TitmussZ (1970) comparison of blood markets. More recently, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) Rnd in a Reld eJperiment that the introduction of a Rne for parents picking up children late from day-care centers increased the number of parents who came late. Brekke, <verndokk, and Nyborg (2003) present a formal model in which Rnancial incentives can have adverse eWects on voluntary contributions because of moral motivations and provide survey evidence on recycling behavior and voluntary community work consistent with the modelZs predictions. Cappellari and Turati (2004) also Rnd that volunteering in a variety of situations is higher when individuals are intrinsically motivated. (2003) show that when information about the nature of a Nob is asymmetric, incentive based payments may signal to workers that the task is onerous and although increasing compensation increases the probability the agent will supply eWort, it also signals to the agent that the Nob is distasteful and aWects their intrinsic motivations to complete the task.
These last two eJplanations (the social norm perspective and the informational theory) suggest a nonmonotonic relationship between Rnancial incentives and task performance.
That is, when Rnancial incentives are introduced, but are small, subNectsZ task performance is worsened as compared to the no payment condition (either because they now think of the eJchange with the eJperimentor as a market one instead of a social one or because they see the task as more onerous than before), but as Rnancial incentives are increased, task performance increases if the Rnancial incentives are sizeable enough. Recent research by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) provides supportive evidence for these theories. They Rnd that Rnancial incentives have a nonmonotonic eWect on task performanceV small Rnancial incentives worsen task performance, while eJcessively high Rnancial incentives can have no signiRcant eWect. 9 We now turn to our eJperimental design and how we study these questions.
The Experimental Design
The Voting Game
General Experimental Procedures
SubNects were recruited from the undergraduate population at a large public university and had no prior eJperience with our eJperiment. Upon arrival, subNects were seated at computer terminals. The computer terminals were place dthroughout the laboratory so that subNects
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could not see each othersZ displays. A monitor was present to answer questions, to ensure that subNects did not communicate with each other, and to pay subNects after the eJperiment ended. When a subNect entered the laboratory, she was given a card with a unique subNect number, which identiRed the subNect during the eJperiment. Although each subNect obviously knew her own subNect number, she did not know the subNect numbers assigned to others.
The eJperimental program displayed the instructions to each subNect. SubNects read them at their leisure and were permitted to ask questions about the procedures. The instructions took between Rve to ten minutes to read. Afterward, each subNect took an online quiz. dnce all subNects passed the quiz, the eJperiment began and it lasted approJimately an hour. At the end of the eJperiment subNects were paid privately in cash. The average payment was 22 dollars per subNect.
SubNects were told that they would participate in a series of elections and that the elections would be decided by maNority rule. They were not told how many elections would take place. dn each subNectZs display for each period appeared a payoW schedule, which we describe below, that showed a subNect how much she would earn if she voted for an alternative and it won a maNority rule election, and how much she would earn if she voted for an alternative and it lost. SubNects were also given information about the payoW schedules of other voters as described below.
Voter PayoBs
SubNects were divided into groups of 5 voters. SubNects chose whether to vote for one of two options, labeled green or red, which we denote as  and , respectively (abstention was not allowed). We deRne subNect Zs choice by the vote vector 
SubNects were assigned in each period to two payoW types:  for green or  for red. 10 SubNects were told that each subNectZs type was a random, independent draw. However, draws were not purely random as the computer programZs draws were designed to ensure that in each period at least one subNect was of each type fthat is, the possible combinations were either 4 green and 1 red, 3 green and 2 red 2 green and 3 red, or 1 green and 4 redg. 11
PayoWs for subNects depended both on who won and whether an individual voted for the winner as follows:
where   is the payoW received by a subNect of type      is the probability that  winsV  and  are constants such that        If a subNect voted for  these payoWs simplify to:
and if a subNect voter for  we have:
As can be seen, the subNectsZ payoWs depended not only on who won but on how they voted independent of the eWect of their vote on the outcome of the election. For instance, if 1 0 SubNects stayed within the same voting groups during a session, but their identities were unknown from period to period. 1 1 Although this was a slight deception, the probability that all Rve voters would be of the same type is equal to 0.031 and even in the longest sessions would be eJpected to occur on average once and unlikely at all in the shorter eJperimental sessions. We discuss how we deal with this issue in more detail in our discussion of voter information.
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 won, a  subNect received her highest payoW, , if she voted for , but 0 if she voted for . If  won a  subNect received    if she voted for , but she received      if she voted for . As a consequence, subNects who eJpect the candidate who would give them the highest payoW to lose, had an incentive to vote strategically for the other candidate.
In our eJperiments we investigated three payoW treatments:
1. A no Rnancial incentive or no payment treatment, 2. A typical Rnancial incentive treatment which yields subNects the average session payment as has been normally provided in voting eJperiments (which we call the low payment treatment) where    and   , 3. A high Rnancial incentive treatment where payments were double the typical amounts at    and    (which we call the high payment treatment).
The payoWs were presented to the subNects in a table form. In the no payment treatment subNects were told to make choices ias ifj they were maJimizing the payoWs in the low payment treatment and shown the low payment payoW table. Table 1 below presents the payoWs a subNect of type green would see in the low payment treatment (the payoWs seen by red subNects were symmetric and the payoWs received in the high treatment were double these amounts). The literature suggests that the eWects of Rnancial incentives may be related to the compleJity of the tasks before subNects. In order to measure the eWect of compleJity we also varied how much information subNects had about the distribution of subNect types in their groups. In the complete information treatment, subNects were told in each period the complete distribution of voter types (although subNect identities were always anonymous) while in the incomplete information treatment in each period each subNect was told his or her own type as well as the types of two other randomly drawn subNects. In each period the information revealed about other subNects were new random draws.
We utilized both within and between-subNects designs across treatments. That is, in some groups subNects participated in more than one payment or information treatment and in others they participated in only one of the payment andror information treatments. If subNects only participated in the no payment treatment, they received a RJed payment of q22
for their participation in the eJperiment as well as the show-up fee received by all subNects across payment treatments. Table 2 presents a summary of how payment and information treatments were distributed across voting groups in the eJperiment. Note that sessions ranged from 16 to 24 periods. In total we observed 1,200 voting decisions. Furthermore, we have no observations where partial information treatments followed full information ones because in such cases subNects might suspect, given their eJperience under full information, that the types of other subNects were not purely random fin the partial information treatments subNects were never revealed the eJ post distributions of types in a particular period, only the winner of the election in that period, so such updating was not possibleg. fTable 2 hereg
Equilibrium Predictions
Complete Information Voting Game When subNects have complete information over the distribution of types in the electorate and desire to maJimize their payoWs, there are, as in many other similar voting games, multiple equilibria. In order to narrow down our equilibrium predictions we Rrst assume that voters use symmetric strategiesV that is, voters of the same types in the same information set are assumed to use the same strategies. Nevertheless, multiple equilibria also eJist with symmetric strategies. For eJample, suppose that there are three green voters and two red voters. dne Nash equilibrium is for all to vote green, while another is for all to vote red. In fact, both of these equilibria in pure strategies can be easily shown to eJist regardless of the distribution of voting typesV even when all voters are green (red) a Nash equilibrium eJists where all vote red (green). However, such equilibria where all vote for the candidate who gives the minority of voters the highest payoW are not coalition-proof. Moreover, it seems natural that the equilibrium where everyone votes for the candidate who gives the maNority of voters the highest payoW would be focal. Thus we use the following as our benchmark for the Nash equilibrium behavior:
Predicted Nash Behavior in the Complete Information Voting Game: 0ub<ects vote sincerel: for the candidate who gives them the highest pa:o@ when in the ma<orit: and strategicall: for the other candidate when in the minorit:A
The Nash prediction assumes that the subNects are fully rational, maJimize the payoWs they are assigned, and make no errors. However, one of the questions we wish to address is the eJtent that diWerences in Rnancial incentives aWect subNectsZ motivations as well as their cognitive attention to the tasks (which if they are maJimizing eJpected payoWs, is their error rate). Hence, we also consider a version of Nash equilibrium in which we assume that for each subNect both voting choices have a positive probability but that the probabilities are ordered by the eJpected payoWs of the choices according to a quantal response function, which is a statistical version of a best response function. 12 We solve for the RJed point of this iterative process using the logit speciRcation, where the quantal response functions are logit curves and we estimate  as the response parameter. This yields the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) predictions. When   , the response curves are Oat and the voters randomize between voting sincerely and strategically. This is the case where the subNects completely ignore their assigned payoWs and choose randomly. As  approaches , the logit response curves converge to the best response curves. Hence, the Nash equilibrium predictions correspond to a boundary case of the QRE model.
DeRne   as the response parameter in the no payment treatment,   as the response parameter in the low payment treatment, and   as the response parameter in the high payment treatment. We can summarize the literatureZs predictions about the eWects of payment treatment on these values in Table 3 below.
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Financial incentives increase probability of Nash
Financial incentives decrease probability of Nash
In the simple voting game, we eJpect that Rnancial incentives to have either a nonmontonic eWect if Rnancial incentives elevate subNectsZ mood, cause them to overthink the problem, make them think the task is an onerous one, or cause them to feel less motivated to perform a good Nob as they might in a social market.
Furthermore, subNects who are maJimizing payoWs may Rnd it cognitively easier to vote sincerely when in the maNority than strategically when in the minority, although the diWerence in cognitive eWort is small. Hence, if Rnancial incentives cause subNects to pay more cognitive attention to the task, we eJpect that Rnancial incentives have a greater eWect on subNectsZ choices when in the minority than when in the maNority. Conversely, if subNectsZ intrinsic motivation is to vote sincerely or eJpressively, then crowding out of intrinsic motivations may cause a similar relationship.
Incomplete Information Voting Game Solving for equilibria in the incomplete information voting game is more complicated as subNects must not only consider how others will vote but also the information that others may or may not have when voting. SubNects are potentially in three diWerent information sets which we label as follows: dne subNect is the same as the voter and one subNect is diWerent. Hence, if the subNect is green, the possible distributions are 4 green and 1 red, 3 green and 2 red, or 2 green and 3 red.
1. Two other subNects are diWerent from the voter. Thus, if the subNect is green, the possible distributions are 3 green and 2 red, 2 green and 3 red, or 1 green and 4 red.
As in the complete information game there are multiple equilibria. We focus on the coalition-proof equilibrium that we believe is focal and inaturalj in the same way that voting for the candidate favored by the maNority is focal and inatural.j That is, the equilibrium that is more likely to lead to wins by the candidate favored by the maNority. We determined this equilibrium by calculating the probabilities of each of the possible distributions occurring in each information set, the associated probabilities of the information known by the other voters, and assuming that subNectsZ maJimize eJpected payoWs accordingly. 13 We summarize the predicted behavior below:
Predicted Bayesian-Nash Behavior in the Incomplete Information Voting Game: 0ub<ects vote sincerel: for the candidate that :ields them the highest pa:o@ when the: either learn that at least one other voter is the same as themselves Binformation sets C and DE and strategicall: for the other candidate when the: learn that at least two other voters are di@erent from themselves Binformation set FEA
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Although the calculations behind these predictions are tedious, the intuition behind them is relatively simple. When voters observe that at least one other voter is the same as themselves they know that there is a greater than 50p probability that they are in the maNority and that there is a higher than 50p probability that other voters also observe that their type is in the maNority. When voters observe that at least two other voters are diWerent from themselves the opposite is true. If all voters adopt the Bayesian-Nash predictions of voting sincerely in the Rrst case and strategically in the second, then eJpected utility is maJimized for all, given rational eJpectations on the choices of the other votersZ given their eJpected information.
Because the intuition is simple, this might be a case where subNects using a simple heuristic would choose more rationally than subNects who attempt to calculate their eJpected payoWs accounting for strategic behavior of other subNects. Thus, it is conceivable that Rnancial incentives or increased Rnancial incentives make task performance more diUcult in the incomplete information game if subNects ioverthinkj the problem before them even in the compleJ game.
As above with the complete information case, we eJpect that subNects may not be motivated by the payoWs as manipulated by the eJperimentor and also might make errors, even if they are maJiming their payoWs. Hence, we solve for the QRE predictions as above. lalues of the response parameters can then be used as described above in Table 3 to determine the eWects of varying Rnancial incentives. Furthermore, compleJity might aWect the relationship between Rnancial incentives and the response parameters. DeRne    as the response parameter in payment treatment  (as deRned above) and information treatment    for incomplete information, 1 for complete information. We can summarize the literatureZs predictions about the eWects of payment treatment on these values in Table 4 below. 
The eWects of treatment  is unaWected by compleJity
CompleJity reduces the eWects of treatment 
CompleJity increases the eWects of treatment  As above, we might eJpect the decisions that subNects face in some information sets to be cognitively easier than other decisions. In particular, a subNect in information set 1, knowing she is in the maNority, may Rnd it easier to vote sincerely, but subNects in information sets 2 and 3 may Rnd their optimal choices more diUcult to determine. Thus, we eJpect that Rnancial incentives may have diWerent eWects on subNectsZ choices in the diWerent information environments.
Experimental Results

Complete Information Treatments Financial Incentives and Voting Behavior Financial Incentives Versus No Incentives In the complete information voting games
we Rnd signiRcant support for the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium prediction that voters will vote sincerely when they are in maNority, regardless of whether they receive Rnancial incentives and the size of the incentives if they are received fin the no payment and high payment treatments 100p of voters choose sincerely when in the maNority and 97p in the low payment treatmentg.
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However, when voters are in the minority, we Rnd less support for the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in the no payment treatment compared to the paid treatments. We Rnd that voters are signiRcantly more likely to vote sincerely when they are in the minority in the no payment treatment compared with the low and high payment treatments combined.
That is, in the no payment treatment 52p of the voters in the minority vote sincerely, while in the low payment treatment only 6p do and in the high payment treatment only 4p vote sincerely ft statisic t 6.13 for the comparison between the unpaid and paid treatmentsg. As noted above, this could be eJplained by the small additional cognitive leap needed to vote strategically when in the minority. It also could reOect an intrinsic motivation of subNects to vote sincerely or eJpressively.
Although these signiRcance tests are informative, a better evaluation of the closeness of behavior to the Nash prediction is aWorded through our QRE estimation, which is illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows the relationship between the predicted QRE probabilities of voting sincerely as a function of whether a voter is in the maNority or minority and the Notice that the probability that maNority voters vote sincerely converges initially towards the Nash prediction faster than the probability that minority voters vote strategically. This reOects the fact that if subNects in the maNority are voting with positive probability the can- didate that yields them the lower payoW, subNects in the minority (because of their minority status) have a greater probability of voting sincerely for that same candidate which gives them a higher payoW. Hence, although when    both types randomize between voting sincerely and strategically at equal rates, as maNority types increase their probability of voting sincerely, so do minority voters at Rrst. Then as maNority votersZ probability of voting sincerely increases further, the associated equilibrium probability that minority voters vote sincerely falls, eventually converging to 0. This means that observing that minority voters vote less likely as predicted by Nash than maNority voters may be an equilibrium choice for the minority voters. The advantage of using the QRE estimation to compare payment treatments is that we can estimate a closeness to Nash behavior combining across voter status (maNority and minority) which takes account the interactive nature of the choices.
When we combine behavior across voter status, we Rnd that the eWect of Rnancial incentives on overall voting behavior is signiRcant This is supported by our estimates of       and   (which are reported below in Table 5 as well as a summary of the data). In a   likelihood ratio test we reNect the null hypothesis of no diWerence between the values at a 5p level. 
The EBect of Experience on Subjects Behavior
Repetition within a Treatment In order to determine if eJperience within a particular payment treatment aWected subNect behavior we compared their choices in the Rrst four periods with their behavior in the last four periods within each treatment (therefore if the treatment took place in periods 9-16 we compared periods 9-12 with periods 13-16). We found no signiRcant diWerence in behavior, even when we restricted our analysis to the Rrst 8 periods of the eJperiment. These results suggest any learning that took place in a treatment took place early and the Rnancial incentives that induced more strategic behavior of subNects in the minority were eWective without much repetition or feedback.
Experience with Payments on Behavior in Unpaid Treatments
We also consider the eWects of eJperiencing payment treatments on behavior within the no payment treatment.
We might imagine that subNects who have eJperienced a payment treatment would be more likely to have internalized the motivation given by the eJperimentor and continue to choose as they have in the payment treatment if the crowding out eWect is permanent. dn the otherhand, subNects who have eJperienced a payment treatment may return to their intrinsic motivations or resent not being paid, and make choices purposely at variant with what they perceive the eJperimentor prefers.
To determine if eJperience with payment results in unpaid subNects making choices similar to those paid, we compare the choices of unpaid subNects who have eJperienced payment treatments with other subNects and themselves (that is, we compare the choices of the subNects in group 2 during periods 17-24 with other subNects and themselves). We compare only their These results suggest that subNects tend to vote sincerely when in the minority that is crowded out by Rnancial incentives, but re-emerges, although not as strong, when Rnancial incentives are removed. The fact that paid subNects rarely voted sincerely when in the minority, suggests that those unpaid with payment eJperience cognitively understood the beneRts of voting strategically, but chose not to do so. This could have been because they wished to vote sincerely or eJpressively, or because they wanted to thwart the eJperimentorZs research, or they felt doing so would end the eJperiment earlier by not having to think about the distribution of voting types. Using only this data we cannot distinguish between these possible motivations. we Rnd that although a high percentage vote sincerely in the no payment treatment, 65p, in the low and high payment treatments combined subNects voted sincerely 95p of tthe time, a diWerence that is highly signiRcant ft statistic t 5.56g. Similarly, in the second information set when subNects should also vote sincerely, we Rnd a similar highly signiRcant result_in the no payment treatment 69p vote sincerely while in the low and high payment treatments combined 84p vote sincerely ft statistic t 3.68g. Finally, in the third information set when subNects should vote strategically, we Rnd that in the no payment treatment 69p vote sincerely, the same as in the second information set, but in the low and high payment treatments combined only 32p vote sincerely ft statistic t 3.81g.
Hence, we Rnd strong evidence, across information sets, of behavior more consistent with the Bayesian-Nash predictions when voters receive Rnancial incentives. However, as in the complete information analysis, subNects choices in these sets depend on their eJpectations of other choices and the equilibrium probability of voting close to Nash will depend both on oneZs information set and the randomization of the other voters. Figure 2 presents the QRE estimated probabilities of voting sincerely as a function of the response parameters graphically for the zero and low payment treatments and the high payment treatment respectively. The circles represent the observed data and the vertical lines the estimated values of  Notice that as in the complete information case, all voters initially increase their probabilities of voting sincerely as  increases beyond 0. loters in information set 1 initially converges faster to the Nash equilibrium prediction and those in information set 2 follows, with voters in information set 3 continuing to randomize at high rates between sincere and strategic behavior for values of    (graphical near convergence for voters in information set 3 does not occur until   ).
fFigure 2 hereg
Using the QRE estimation we Rnd strong evidence, across information sets, of behavior more consistent with the Bayesian-Nash predictions when voters receive Rnancial incentives. dur estimates of       and   are reported below in Table 6 , as well as a summary of the data, and the corresponding   likelihood ratio tests.
fTable 6 hereg
The EBects of High Financial Incentives As in the complete information treatments, we compare voting behavior in the low and high payment treatments to determine if increasing Rnancial incentives aWects voter behavior. We Rnd that in information sets 2 and 3, subNects are signiRcantly more likely to choose the Bayesian-Nash predicted strategies when payments are higher than the typical amount paid ft stastistics t 2.69 and 2.07, respectivelyg, but there is no signiRcant diWerence in information set 1. This is supportive of the conNecture that information set 1 is cognitively easier as well as the QRE predictions that these voters will converge towards equilibrium strategies initially at a faster rate. Combining across information sets using the   likelihood ratio test reported in Table 6 , we Rnd that the These results suggest then that in a more compleJ voting game, involving incomplete information, increasing Rnancial incentives beyond the typical levels used in such eJperiments leads to a signiRcantly higher probability of choosing the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies.
The EBect of Experience on Subjects Behavior
Repetition within a Treatment As with the complete information treatment, we divided each payment treatment into early and late halves and compared voting behavior for each information set in each payment treatment. First, we Rnd no signiRcant diWerence between the Rrst and second halves of the high payment treatment in any of the information sets, even when we restrict our analysis to the cases where subNects eJperienced the high payment treatment in the Rrst 8 periods.
Second, we Rnd that in the low payment treatment, subNects in the second information set were more likely to vote as predicted in the second half of the treatment (70p in the Rrst half and 85p in the second half, t statistic t 2.01), suggesting some learning. This learning eWect is demonstrated even when the low payment treatment was the Rrst payment treatment observed (67p of voters in this case voted as predicted in the Rrst half and 92p in the second half, t statistic t 2.52). Thus, repetition does appear to help subNects determine the optimal stategy in the second information set when payment is at a typical level.
Third, in the no payment treatment we Rnd no evidence of learning. In fact, Nust the opposite. Not only do voters in the no payment treatment in the Rrst information set vote sincerely signiRcantly less than those who are receiving Rnancial incentives they are less likely Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments to do so in the later periods (81p in the Rrst half but only 47p in the second half, t statistic t 2.29). In the second information set, they similarly regress, voting as predicted 81p in the Rrst half and only 62p in the second half (t statistic t 2.85). In the third information set, there is no signiRcant change in behavior over time.
In summary, we Rnd an apparent trade-oW between size of payment and the beneRt of repetition and feedback as well as some evidence of an interactive eWect between payment and repetition. The tendency of the subNects in the no payment treatments to vote sincerely less often than paid subNects which actually increasing during a no payment treatment suggests that the eJcessive sincere voting by unpaid subNects in the complete information voting game was not an eJpressive act but reOected either a desire to thwart the eJperimentor or to make the easiest choice to try to have the eJperiment end more quickly.
Experience with Payments on Behavior in Unpaid Treatments Unlike the complete information treatments where subNects who eJperienced a no payment treatment also eJperienced a payment treatment, we have both within and between subNects payment treatment comparisons for the incomplete information voting game. It is possible that the behavior in the no payment treatment when subNects only eJperience that treatment (group 7) is signiRcantly diWerent from the behavior in no payment treatments when subNects also eJperienced payments (groups 3-6). The theories that Rnancial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivations because they signal to subNects that the eJchange is Rnancial, not social, or that they signal that a task is distasteful are arguably best tested in a between subNects design. That is, in the within subNects sessions, the introduction of Rnancial incentives in other periods may cause subNects to perceive the no payment treatment as a Rnancial eJchange that is eJtremely low paid but in the sessions where there is no performance incentive in any period is less likely to be perceived in this manner.
To consider this possibility we compare the behavior of subNects in the no payment treatments in the between subNects design in two ways:
1. Comparison with those in the no payment treatments in the within subNects design:
We Rnd that the unpaid subNects in the between design vote signiRcantly diWerent from the unpaid subNects in the within design only in the second information set where the between design subNects vote sincerely 47p of the time compared to 71p for the within design ones (t statistic t 2.73). 14 2. Comparison with those in paid between subNects design: We Rnd that in information sets 1 and 2, unpaid subNects choose the Bayesian-Nash predicted strategies signiRcantly less often that those in either the low or high payment treatment_in information set 1 paid subNects voted sincerely 100p of the time compared to no payment choices of 50p (t statistic t 3.61) and in information set 2 paid subNects voted sincerely 83p of the time compared to no payment choices of 47p (t statistic t 4.28). dnly in information set 3 do we Rnd unpaid subNects choosing insigniRcantly diWerent from paid subNects_ paid subNects choose sincerely 48p of the time compared to unpaid subNects who choose sincerely 53p of the time. If in information set 3 we restrict our comparison to no payment versus high payment, the diWerence between the two (high payment subNects choose sincerely 30p of the time) is signiRcant at the 10p level on a one-tailed test.
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These results appear to reNect the hypothesis that the subNects who only participated in the no payment treatment are intrinsically more motivated to devote cognitive attention to the task than those who are eJperiencing both payment and no payment treatments.
Finally, as in the complete information analysis, we consider whether payment eJperience inOuences the choices of subNects in the no payment treatment. Three groups of subNects received payment eJperience before participating in the no payment treatment (groups 4, 5, and 6).
Again, we make three comparisons:
1. Comparison of subNects in group 4 in periods 17-24 with subNects in group 3 in the same periods (who are in the high payment condition): We Rnd that the eJperienced paid subNects choose the Bayesian-Nash strategies signiRcantly more often in information sets 1 and 2 than the eJperienced unpaid ones (unpaid subNects choose sincerely 29p of the time in information set 1 compared to 100p for paid subNects, t statistic t 3.87V unpaid subNects choose sincerely 42p of the time in information set 2 compared to 96p of the time for paid subNects, t statistic t 4.99).
2. Comparison of subNects in no payment treatments with eJperience (combining choices in groups 4, 5, and 6) with those without eJperience (no payment treatments in groups 3, 7, and 10): We Rnd no signiRcant diWerences in the choices made in information sets 1 and 2 (those without eJperience choose sincerely in the Rrst information set 67p of the time, those with eJperience choose sincerely 62p of the timeV those without eJperience choose sincerely in the second information set 65p of the time, those with eJperience choose sincerely 75p of the time). We Rnd that those with eJperience choose Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments sincerely signiRcantly more often in information set 3 than those without eJperience (85p compared to 53p, t statistic t 3.04), which is contrary to the Bayesian-Nash prediction.
3. Comparison with unpaid subNects in groups 4, 5, and 6 to earlier periods when they received payments: We Rnd that in information sets 1 and 3 these subNects chose significantly closer to the Bayesian-Nash predicted strategies when paid than when unpaid (in information set 1, when paid they voted sincerely 91p of the time, 62p when unpaid, t statistic t 1.97V in information set 3, when paid they voted sincerely 28p of the time, 85p when unpaid, t statistic t 7.31). In information set 2, those paid voted sincerely 82p of the time, when unpaid 75p of the time, an insigniRcant diWerence.
These results, as in the complete information voting game, suggest that unpaid subNects with payment eJperience appear not to internalize the motivations from being paid. They do not vote sincerely less often than paid subNects and less often than predicted, as previously noted. These results suggest that unpaid subNects wish to either thwart the eJperimentor or choose quickly, without much thought, in order to end the eJperiment earlier.
Comparison Across Information Treatments dur eJperimental design allows us to evaluate the eWects of increasing compleJity of the tasks before subNects on the eWect of Rnancial incentives. We classiRed subNectsZ vote choices as irationalj according to whether they followed the Bayesian-Nash predicted strategies for their information set in both the simple and compleJ games. A simple comparison shows not surprisingly that the percentage voting rationally across payment treatments in the complete information game, 91p, is signiRcantly higher than the percentage voting rationally across Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments payment treatments in the incomplete information game, 74p (t statistic t 8.20). We Rnd similar signiRcant diWerences when we compare by payment treatment. 15 We also have within subNects comparisons of the eWect of information for groups 10, 11, and 12. These subNects Rrst eJperience the incomplete information game. We Rnd similarly that they choose signiRcantly more rationally in the complete information game overall (93p compared to 81p, t statistic t 2.93), although when we break down the comparisons by payment treatment, the diWerence is only signiRcant for the low and high payment treatments. 16 We also estimated constrained values of       and   pooling the two information treatments for each payment treatment. We estimated as well a constrained value of  pooling together all information and payment treatments. These estimations and the corresponding values of the   likelihood ratio tests for signiRcant diWerences between treatments are presented in Table 7 below. First, we Rnd that in the high payment treatment, we cannot reNect the null hypothesis that subNectsZ choices are similar across information treatments.
This suggests that the high payment treatment is suUcient to overcome the greater compleJity in the voting game. In contrast, when subNects are not paid or receive low payments, compleJity of the game leads to subNects making choices that are signiRcantly less like the Bayesian-Nash prediction. fTable 7 hereg 1 5 In the no payment treatment 79p vote rationally under complete information and 59p under incomplete information (t statistic t 4.19)V in the low payment treatment 96p vote rationally under complete information and 74p under incomplete information (t statistic t 6.75)V and in the high payment treatment 98p vote rationally under complete information and 87p under incomplete information (t statistic t 4.82). 1 6 In the no payment treatment 80p vote rationally under complete information and 75p under incomplete information (t statistic t 0.53)V in the low payment treatment 100p vote rationally under complete information and 85p under incomplete information (t statistic t 2.62)V and in the high payment treatment 100p vote rationally under complete information and 83p under incomplete information (t statistic t 2.88). Evidence suggests that eJperimental research in political science will continue to eJpand in scope and inOuence. However, divisions within the eJperimental community over methods can be both confusing and counterproductive. dne of these divisions concerns the motivation of subNects, which we have studied here. We have found evidence that in political economy eJperiments Rnancial incentives can increase the likelihood that subNects make choices closer to those predicted by game theoretic models in which subNects maJimize payoWs. We interpet that evidence to imply that Rnancial incentives cause subNects to devote more cognitive attention to tasks. dur evidence provides little support for theories that contend that Rnancial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivations that the eJperimentalist would not prefer reduced. We Rnd no evidence that subNects overthink their tasks when provided Rnancial incentives or that an elevated mood causes them to perform less well. Higher payments in the simple voting game do not cause subNects to choose diWerent strategies and appear to increase subNects cognitive activity in the compleJ voting game. We Rnd that repetition, in the low payment treatment in the compleJ game, increases the eWect of the treatment. However, if mood was the eJplanation for the lower performance in the early rounds then we would eJpect a similar relationship for the high payment treatment. The evidence suggests that what we observe is learning and that increasing Rnancial incentives accelerates that learning as subNects devote more cognitive attention to the tasks.
    
We Rnd no evidence that subNects in the unpaid treatment are socially motivated enough to perform at a level equal to or eJceeding the levels of subNects in the paid treatment.
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Similarly, we Rnd little support for the informational eJplanation for a crowding out eWect of Rnancial incentives. Although the tendency to vote sincerely in the complete information voting game is intriguing as possible evidence of an intrinsic motivation that eJists outside the eJperiment, the contrary tendencies of subNects in the incomplete information voting game suggests that these intrinsic motivations are eJperiment speciRc. dur evidence suggests that subNects who are not paid choose to devote little cognitive attention to their tasks and perhaps may be choosing to thwart the eJperimentorZs research.
Since our results are contrary to those found by Heyman and Ariely and other psychologists it is useful to consider why that is the case. First, it might be the case that we are not suUciently testing the hypothesis of Heyman and Ariely (2004) as our no payment treatment may create in subNectsZ minds the view of the eJperimental eJchange as a monetary one even though the subNects are not paid. This is particularly possible in the within subNects treatments where subNects participate in no payment treatments as well as paid ones. It is diUcult to envision how a researcher can create an unpaid eJperiment that would not assign some values to the choices and at the same time test a theory in which choices are assumed to have values that are ordered. Furthermore, we Rnd little diWerence between the behavior of subNects in the unpaid treatment who only participate in that treatment and those who participate in both paid and unpaid treatments.
Second, the tasks faced by subNects in our eJperiments, as part of a voting game, may be inherently more interesting to subNects than the individual decision making tasks usually given to subNects in psychology eJperiments which could eJplain the conOicting results. It is unclear why a more interesting task would have such an eWect as a common intuition might be Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments that subNects are more motivated in unpaid interesting tasks than otherwise. Hence, it would seem that our tasks make the test stronger. Another diWerence between our subNectsZ tasks and the tasks of earlier studies is that Rnancial incentives in a game not only relate subNects behavior to consequence but also place the subNect in an interactive game. It may be that in individualized tasks subNects place a higher value on cognitive activity in an unrewarded individual decision making activity than they do in a game activity.
Third, our eJperimental design does not evaluate small, less than typical Rnancial incentives as Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) and Heyman and Ariely consider, and it may be that introducing these incentives reduces task performance as they found in their eJperiments.
However, such small, insigniRcant incentives are rarely used in political economy eJperiments and thus it is unclear how relevant such a Rnding might be.
dur results have a number of implications for future eJperimental research. First, if the goal of an eJperiment is evaluate a theory in which actorsZ choices are assumed to have consequences that are ordered and salient, Rnancial incentives can provide subNects with motivations similar to those assumed in the theory. We believe this is true regardless of whether the eJperiment is conducted by political economists or political psychologists. It is possible in political psychology eJperiments to provide subNects with Rnancial incentives that can provide subNects with motivations that are similar to those assumed as discussed in the Introduction. For eJample, if the theory assumes that subNects care about policy choices of candidates but perceive that women are more liberal than men, an eJperiment that rewards subNects for choosing candidates based on policy preferences eJpressed before the eJperiment is conducted is a more robust test of whether subNects have such gender Incentives, Complexity, and Motivations in Experiments stereotypes. Financial incentives, since they focus subNects on the cognitive tasks at hand and make those choices salient, can, we believe, lead to more robust tests of theories of both political economists and political psychologists.
Second, if the eJperimentor wishes to generalize from the eJperiment to other settings (observational and eJperimental) in which individualsZ choices have consequences (such as in a legislature or other strategic political situation), Rnancial incentives that make subNectsZ choices in the eJperiment equivalently consequential increase the eJternal validity and generalizability of the results since subNects are more motivated to engage in cognitive activities as they would be outside the eJperiment in eJperiments with Rnancial incentives. If we Rnd the subNects in such situations making choices that are contrary to the theoretical predictions (either due to altruism, fairness, reciprocity, cognitive diUculties, framing and priming, or racism) then our Rndings are more eJternally valid.
